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 1 
PROTECTING ME FROM MY  
DIRECTIVE 
ENSURING APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR ADVANCE 
DIRECTIVES IN DEMENTIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
With one in six people over 80 now suffering from dementia, advance directives 
provide an important means of empowerment. Upholding directives in the context of 
dementia however, raises extra challenges, given the potential for the directive to 
conflict with an assessment of what is in the person’s current best interests. Given the 
profound harm that tying a person with dementia to their previous wishes can do, it is 
essential that we have sufficient safeguards in place to ensure that we only uphold 
such directives where we can be sure they are truly autonomous and are intended to 
apply to the situation at hand- safeguards which are at present, severely lacking.   
 
This paper will consider various mechanisms by which safeguards can be built into 
the legal regime to ensure that the original decision is autonomous, including making 
it mandatory for the person to undergo a consultation with a healthcare professional, 
which would involve a contemporaneous capacity assessment.  Clinicians must also 
be confident that the directive applies to the situation at hand. Introducing formalities, 
including a standardised (though not mandatory) proforma, may help to enhance 
specificity about when the directive is triggered, and to what treatments it relates, to 
enable clinicians to better assess the directive’s applicability. A national registry for 
advance directives might also be beneficial. It will be argued that health care 
professionals will have to play a much greater role in the drafting and registering of 
advance directives, if we are to feel comfortable in upholding them. 
 
 Key words: advance decisions, advance directives, dementia, incapacity, 
prospective autonomy, safeguards 
 
I INTRODUCTION  
 
Under section 24 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, a person may, at a time at which 
they retain capacity, create an advance directive to refuse certain treatments. The 
advance directive will apply if, ‘at a later time and in such circumstances as he may 
specify’,1 the treatment in question is proposed to be carried out or continued and the 
person lacks capacity to consent.  
 
 
1 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s24. 
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In most cases, upholding a directive will prove uncontroversial. As advance directives 
are usually made to refuse life-prolonging treatment,2 most people will only wish to 
refuse such treatment where either the treatment is required when they are in their 
final stages of life, or where, due to illness or accident, they have been left severely 
and permanently incapacitated (for example in a persistent vegetative or minimally 
conscious state). In such circumstances, life-sustaining treatment will often not be 
considered in the person’s best interests, and thus following the advance directive 
may be unproblematic as the treatment is likely to be denied regardless of whether the 
directive is being followed or a best interests assessment is being made (albeit that the 
absence of a directive may result in the case having to go to Court for an order to be 
made that it is in the person’s best interests3). Dementia however, can present a rare 
conflict between a previously made directive, and what the person currently wants or 
what the doctor believes (taking into account the person’s other past and present 
wishes), is in their best interests. This is unlikely to be the case where the person’s 
dementia causes them considerable distress and discomfort. Rather, the concern is 
with people for whom dementia does not render them distressed, in pain, or close to 
death; the “pleasantly demented”, as Rhoden puts it.4 For these people the advance 
directive may not be reflective of values they now hold, or interests they now have. 
Although there is currently no case law on the issue, given the profound harm that 
tying them to their previous wishes could therefore cause, sufficient safeguards are 
essential to ensure that such directives are only upheld where we can be sure that they 
are truly autonomous and are intended to apply to the situation at hand.  
 
Whether we ought to uphold advance directives in this context has been subject to 
considerable debate.5 However even for those offering the most vociferous defence of 
advance directives,6 their moral authority stems from their respect for a person’s 
precedent autonomy. The ethical justification offered is that a person has a right to 
decide, at a time at which they are still able to make an autonomous decision, how 
they wish to be treated when they have lost that ability. If the original decision is not 
 
2 P. Triplett et al. ‘Content of Advance Directives for individuals with advanced dementia’ (2008) 
Journal of Aging and Health 20:583-596. 
3 As cases such as Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67 
demonstrate.  
4 N. Rhoden, ‘The Limits of Legal Objectivity’ (1990) North Carolina Law Review 68:845-65. 
5 For a more detailed discussion, see R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion (Harper Collins, 1993), 179-217; R. 
Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and the demented self’, The Millbank Quarterly 1986;64(2): 4-16; R. 
Dresser, ‘Dworkin on Dementia’ (1995) Hastings Center Report 25(6), 32; D. Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons (OUP, 1986), 204-209; B.A. Rich, 'Prospective Autonomy and Critical Interests: A 
Narrative Defense of the Moral Authority of Advance Directives' (1997) 6 Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 138; H. Kuhse, ‘Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, 
Personhood, and Personal Identity’ (1999) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 347-364; J. Wall, 
‘Being and Being Lost’ in C. Foster, J. Herring and I. Doron, The Law and Ethics of Dementia (Hart 
Publishing, 2014); C. Korsgard, ‘Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to 
Parfit’ (1989) Philosophy and Public Affairs 18(2)101-132;; A. Jaworska, “Respecting the Margins 
of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 28, no.2 
(1999):105-138.  
6 R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion (Harper Collins, 1993), 179-217; R. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and the 
demented self’, The Millbank Quarterly 1986;64(2): 4-16.  
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therefore autonomous at the time it was made, the justification for upholding them 
dissipates: the directive loses its moral authority. Given this, it is perhaps surprising 
that there are so few legal safeguards in place to ensure that advance decisions are 
autonomous at the time of drafting. In the absence of these, we cannot be justified in 
upholding an advance directive where doing so may be deeply harmful to the person.  
 
Despite the potentially widespread risk of this problem (with one in six people over 
80 now suffering from dementia7), the legal framework surrounding advance 
directives is yet to receive much attention in the literature. This paper will consider 
various mechanisms by which safeguards can be built into the legal regime to ensure 
that an advance directive is autonomous, including making it mandatory for the 
person to undergo a consultation with a healthcare professional, which would involve 
a contemporaneous capacity assessment.  Clinicians must also be confident that the 
directive is intended to apply to the situation at hand, necessitating a degree of 
precision in the drafting of it. Introducing formalities, including a standardised 
(though not mandatory) proforma, may help to enhance specificity about when the 
directive is triggered, and to what treatments it relates, to enable clinicians to better 
assess whether the directive was intended to apply in the current circumstances. It will 
be argued that healthcare professionals will have to play a much greater role in the 
drafting and registering of advance directives, if we are to feel comfortable in 
upholding them.  
 
A more fundamental problem however remains. Given the dramatic changes of 
character that dementia can provoke, this raises the question of whether it is still right 
to uphold a directive where a person’s values, priorities or lifestyle have changed so 
significantly since drafting the directive, that it is unclear whether the values which 
underpinned the decision have remained the same. While there is no way of 
alleviating this problem (this is an inherent difficulty with making decisions in 
advance), steps can be taken, for example encouraging directives to include a 
‘statement of values’, to inform the doctor of the values underpinning the advance 
decision, so that they can assess whether these might have changed. Explicitly stating 
whether there are any circumstances which might invalidate the directive, or render it 
inapplicable, would also help in this regard, both for the doctor later called upon the 
implement the directive, and for the person drafting the directive, to help them direct 
and channel their thoughts and wishes.   
 
Even where the robustness of advance directives is improved, there remains a further 
problem, of ensuring that the directive comes to the attention of the treating clinician 
at the relevant time. While placing the directive in medical records might present a 
cheaper, and less onerous way of recording directives, until integrated electronic 
health records are completed across the UK, this may not render directives 
 
7 Alzheimer’s Society, ‘Statistics’, <www.alzheimers.org.uk/statistics> accessed 23rd May 2015.  
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sufficiently accessible, and thus a national registry may be preferable if the aim of 
respecting a person’s autonomy is to be achieved.   
 
Enhancing the safeguards surrounding advance directives is essential, especially in 
the context of dementia. This will require doctors to act as ‘gatekeepers’ for the 
validity of directives, necessitating a far greater readiness to engage in discussions 
about end-of-life care. However it is only through ensuring the ‘medical quality’ of 
advance directives, that the law can be justified in upholding them.  
 
II ETHICAL CHALLENGES POSED BY ADVANCE 
DIRECTIVES 
 
The ethical basis for upholding advance directives has been subject to much critique 
in the literature.8 While it is not the intention of this paper to delve further into this 
debate, it is clear that underpinning the defence of advance directives is the belief that 
directives respect, and give effect to, a person’s precedent autonomy.9 As such, a 
directive may only be justified in so far as it represents an autonomous choice. In the 
absence of this the directive loses its moral authority, and therefore there can be no 
ethical basis for upholding it. Given the inherent nature of advance directives involves 
making a decision in anticipation of a whole range of possible circumstances, 
conditions and treatment options, a number of potential concerns may be raised about 
whether the choices embodied in directives can be truly autonomous, and therefore 
warrant being upheld.  
 
Innumerable competing conceptions of autonomy have been advanced over the years, 
which emphasise differing aspects as essential to the concept. While it is not possible 
to outline all of these, two conceptions will be considered here for the purposes of 
analysing the position of the law: a minimal conception of autonomy, and a more 
demanding account. At its minimum, autonomy demands that a decision must be 
made with an understanding of its nature and consequences, and free from the 
coercion of others. This, as will be discussed below, is reflected in the legal test for 
capacity.10  In a more demanding account, autonomy requires the ability to apply the 
relevant facts to the values a person holds, to reach a decision that reflects, as 
different commentators have expressed it, their endorsed beliefs or desires,11 their 
underlying and enduring commitments,12 or ‘the self or individuality of the person’, 
however this is understood.13 This section will explore some of the challenges that 
anticipatory decisions may pose for meeting such accounts of autonomy. While these 
 
8 Supra n5.  
9 Supra n6.  
10 MCA s3(1).  
11 A. Jaworska, ‘Respecting the margins of agency: Alzheimer’s patients and the capacity to value.’ 
(1999) Philos Public Aff 28(2): 105–138.  
12 A. Buchanan & D. Brock. Deciding for Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
41.  
13 O. O’Neill. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; 2002), 34. 
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concerns relate to the quality of advance decisions at the time of drafting, there 
remains a second, analytically distinct challenge posed by directives: should they 
continue to be upheld even in instances where the person’s values or priorities have 
changed? It should be noted at the outset that this is not intended to suggest that 
advance directives should never be upheld. Rather, it is the contention of this paper 
that in recognition of these difficulties, the law must take steps to better safeguard the 
authenticity and relevancy of directives, to ensure that only those that are truly 
autonomous are upheld.  
 
A. Ensuring that the decision is autonomous at the time of drafting 
Even at its most limited, autonomy demands that a person understands the nature and 
consequences of the decision they are making. Anticipatory decisions therefore 
inevitably face an epistemic problem: unlike in a contemporaneous decision where the 
current circumstances of the individual, their condition, and the available treatment 
options are all known to the person, for advance decisions this information may all be 
unknown at the time of making it. Advance directives are also likely to apply not just 
to one decision, but to a number of decisions (refusing a number of different 
treatments in a variety of situations) thus demanding an even greater level of 
comprehension, if the implications of each of these is to have been properly 
considered.  
 
For a person’s choice to reflect their autonomous will, that decision must also only be 
applied in the circumstances that they intended. While this may seem a trite 
observation, this can cause particular problems in the context of directives which 
often do not possess the requisite degree of specificity to indicate exactly when the 
directive was intended by the author to apply.14 Particularly in the context of dementia, 
directives often relate to ‘withholding life-sustaining treatment’, or similar wording. 
Many things may fall within the definition of ‘life-sustaining treatment’ however. 
While artificial nutrition and hydration might fall clearly within the sort of treatment 
that the person anticipated when writing the directive, for those advanced in age, 
something as simple as antibiotics for a chest infection could be integral to sustaining 
and prolonging life. Where directives are framed in such vague terms, it is hard to 
know whether this considerably smaller intervention is also the sort of treatment 
which the person intended to refuse, and whether there are forms of palliative care 
that might still be acceptable to the individual.  Indeed the lack of clarity in this 
context might not only apply to what  treatment is covered by the directive, but also to 
when the directive is intended to be triggered. Given that dementia is a degenerative 
disease, there is not a definitive point at which someone ‘gets dementia’ or when their 
dementia ‘becomes severe’, nor is dementia represent a single disease with a defined 
set of symptoms. Despite this gradual process of decline, the triggering conditions of 
 
14 R. Dresser, “Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy” 91995) Hastings Center 
Report 6.  
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the directive are often not set out in sufficient detail to know exactly when it comes 
into force.   
 
Allen Buchanan also points to a further challenge to the quality of directives at the 
time of drafting: the risk that the “informal safeguards” which may restrain imprudent 
choices in the here and now, may not extend to decisions far in the future, which are 
unlikely to provoke the same emotive and protective responses for those around 
them.15 A number of things could therefore call into question the authenticity of an 
advance decision at the time of drafting, and the extent to which it might be described 
as truly autonomous in the senses described above.  It was for this reason that 
Buchanan concludes that “there are several morally significant asymmetries between 
the contemporaneous choice of a competent individual and the issuance of an advance 
directive to cover future decisions”.16 While it may not be possible to alleviate all of 
these asymmetries, it is imperative that the law seeks ways to mitigate the effects of 
these.  
 
B. Challenges to validity on implementation 
Even where a person has the requisite degree of knowledge and understanding at the 
time of drafting however, a further problem remains. As the directive may have been 
drafted a long time in advance it is possible that it may not, at the time of 
implementation, continue to represent the person’s values or priorities. The person 
may have found a religion; got married; or had children. Their lifestyle may have 
changed such that the condition they were painstakingly trying to avoid no longer 
seems so daunting; or they may have anticipated that this decision was in the interests 
of their loved ones, but in fact their family vehemently opposes it. Even if the 
decision was an endorsement of their values and beliefs at the time (and thus 
autonomous in even the most demanding sense), can we still be justified in upholding 
it if there is evidence that the decision no longer reflects the values and beliefs they 
held? To use an extreme example, if a Jehovah’s Witness stipulates that they wish to 
refuse blood transfusions but then subsequently renounces their faith, would it still be 
right to uphold their directive, even if it had been autonomous at the time that it was 
made? 
 
At the time of implementation, there is very little one can do to test or clarify any of 
these issues raised in this section. The person’s capacity, understanding, and 
motivations are all, to an extent, a matter of guess-work: the doctor has no option to 
‘play it safe’ and check, and therefore must make a potentially harmful decision for 
the patient with relatively little, if any, evidence of their previous state of mind. Given 
the clear potential therefore for advance directives to have been made without 
sufficient information and understanding, or to no longer reflect the wishes of the 
person, we should require clear evidence that the decision is autonomous and 
 
15 A. Buchanan, ‘Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem’ (1988) Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 17:278-9.  
16 ibid.  
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applicable if we are to give effect to it in circumstances where it conflicts with a 
doctor’s assessment of their current best interests. The current legal regime however, 
provides insufficient mechanisms by which to ascertain this important evidence.  
 
III PROBLEMS WITH THE LAW’S RESPONSE  
 
To some extent, the law attempts to respond to these ethical challenges through its 
provisions in sections 24 - 26 MCA. As well as requiring the person to have capacity 
in order to create a directive,17 the Act also gives healthcare professionals a relatively 
wide discretion to decide not to uphold directives where they have doubts over 
whether the directive is valid and applicable to the situation at hand. While 
subsequently withdrawing a directive,18 or transferring the power of the decision to a 
Lasting Power of Attorney will render it invalid,19 so too may any behaviour “which 
is clearly inconsistent with the directive”.20 A directive is not applicable meanwhile, if 
the treatment required is not that specified in the advance directive,21 any 
circumstances specified in the directive are absent,22 or “there are reasonable grounds 
for believing that circumstances exist which the patient did not anticipate at the time 
of the advance decision and which would have affected his decision had he 
anticipated them.”23 Section 26 protects healthcare professionals from liability for 
treating patients when they are not “satisfied that an advance decision exists which is 
valid and applicable to the treatment”.24 Applying these provisions raises particular 
problems in the dementia context however.  
 
 
A. Inconsistent behaviour after a loss of capacity 
To be valid, the person must not have behaved in any way that is inconsistent with the 
directive. While this provision may seem to capture the instances articulated above 
(where a person’s values or priorities appear to change after the drafting of the 
directive) it is unclear on the face of the statute whether this is intended to cover only 
behaviour while the person retains capacity, or whether this may apply after losing 
capacity. If the latter then, clearly, the behaviour of a person with dementia could 
often render the directive invalid. While there has been no judicial determination of 
the issue, it is fiercely debated in the academic literature. Alasdair Maclean rightly 
observes that read alongside s24(3), which states that “P may withdraw or alter an 
advance decision at any time when he has capacity to do so”, it may seem logical that 
Parliament intended the provision to be limited to behavior while competent. 
Moreover, as Alex Ruck Keene notes, both of the other provisions within s.25(2) 
 
17 MCA s24(1). 
18 ibid s25(2)(a). 
19 ibid s25(2)(b). 
20 ibid s25(2)(c). 
21 ibid s25(4)(a). 
22 ibid s25(4)(b). 
23 ibid s25(4)(c).  
24 ibid s26(2).  
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clearly relate to circumstances in which the person retains capacity (withdrawing an 
AD, or creating a LPA).25 It nonetheless seems odd that the legislature should not 
have chosen to make this explicit, especially given multiple references to the person’s 
capacity elsewhere in sections 24 to 26. The Government, when responding to 
concerns raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights on this issue, noted that the 
Bill already contained provision for an AD to be invalidated if, under clause 25(2)(c), 
“the person did lack capacity but had acted inconsistently with the advance 
decision”,26 further fueling the debate, though the example then given in the 
Explanatory Notes to the Act, is of an act prior to the onset of incapacity.27 Nor has 
the judiciary been completely clear: in A Local Authority v E28 concerning the 
advance directive of a woman with severe anorexia nervosa, Peter Jackson J discussed 
E’s behavior following her second directive, notwithstanding that she had already 
been found to lack capacity.29 Given the lack of clarity, there is at least an arguable 
case that the actions of a person with dementia after losing capacity might invalidate 
the directive, though the law remains uncertain.  
 
B. Lack of specificity in advance directives 
Concerns about applicability are also exacerbated in dementia cases. Under s25(4) 
MCA a decision will be inapplicable if the treatment required is not that specified in 
the advance directive,30 or any circumstances specified in the directive are absent. As 
mentioned earlier, one of the key problems with advance directives is their vague and 
general phrasing 31 which fails to provide healthcare professionals with sufficient 
information to determine: (i) when the directive is intended to be triggered; (ii) if this 
situation has arisen; and (iii) what the directive requires in response to this. Triplett et 
al for example, found that most directives drafted for those with dementia were 
decisions to refuse life-sustaining treatment if in a PVS, terminal condition or end-
stage condition, though usually the directives did not specifically state the specific 
treatments that were not wanted.32 They concluded that directives are not 
comprehensive enough to cover many frequently encountered scenarios, suggesting 
instead that checklists of several scenarios be presented to the patient so that likely 
scenarios could be prepared for.  
 
This is particularly true given that in England and Wales there is no requirement that 
advance directives can only be made in respect of a condition that the person is 
already diagnosed with.33 While Triplett’s study shows the generality with which 
 
25 A. Ruck Keene, ‘Advance decisions: getting it right?’ (2012) 
<http://www.39essex.com/docs/articles/advance_decisions_paper_ark_december_2012.pdf> at 27.2. 
26 Included as an appendix to The Joint Committee on Human Rights 15th Report of  Session 2004–
05 (2005) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/  jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/97/9702.htm>  
27 Mental Capacity Bill, Explanatory Notes (2004), para 85. 
28 [2012] EWCOP 1639.  
29 ibid, [69].  
30 MCA s25(4)(a). 
31 Supra n14.   
32 Supra n2.  
33 Other jurisdictions do impose such a restriction, for example in Victoria, Australia (Medical 
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even those directives drafted with dementia specifically in mind can be drafted, many 
directives are drafted without any condition in mind at all, covering losses of capacity 
in a number of eventualities. The courts also struggle in this regard: in W Healthcare 
Trust v H,34 despite H saying that she did not “want to be kept alive by machines”, 
Brooke L.J. concluded that this was not “sufficiently clear to amount to a direction 
that she preferred to be deprived of food and drink for a period of time which would 
lead to her death in all circumstances.” Despite attempts post-Aintree to give more 
weight to the wishes and feelings of people lacking capacity when making treatment 
and care decisions,35 evidence of their wishes is frequently vague and inconsistent, 
failing to give clear guidance of what they would want in the particular circumstances 
now under consideration. There is therefore insufficient detail to be able to give 
clarity about when the decision was intended to apply, and therefore to determine 
whether, under s25, it was applicable.  
 
C. The degree of foresight required 
Under s25(4)(c), an advance directive may also be inapplicable if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that circumstances exist which the person had not anticipated at the 
time of drafting the directive and which would have affected his decision. While this 
may cover some of the epistemic concerns raised above about the lack of information 
available to people when drafting directives, it again suffers from ambiguity in the 
context of dementia. Research has frequently shown that while people are often 
gripped with terror at the prospect of an existence with dementia, this is not a reality 
that afflicts all (or even most) people with dementia. While there is evidence that 
some people with dementia often report feelings of loss (of independence, dignity, 
friends, memories), which can lead to low self-esteem and depression,36 and with it 
the desire to end one’s life, others have been found to live a perfectly peaceful and 
contented existence,37 indicating that anticipating the impact of dementia is incredibly 
difficult. Evidence also suggests a tendency for the competent person to 
underestimate the quality of life of the incompetent.38 While contemplating existence 
with a physical impairment is hard,39 understanding the impact of cognitive decline is 
even more difficult, such that to some extent all advance directives in the dementia 
context may fail sufficiently to “anticipate” everything which would have affected the 
decision, and thus be inapplicable. This issue of applicability is clearly confounded by 
the issues that plague all advance directives, namely that the therapeutic options may 
change considerably, as might the values and priorities of the person drafting the 
 
Treatment Act 1988 (Vic)).  
34 [2005] 1 WLR 834. 
35 See A. Ruck Keene and C. Auckland, ‘More presumptions please?  Wishes, feelings and best 
interests decision-making’ (2015) 3 Elder Law Journal 293. 
36 N. Aggarwal et al, ‘People with dementia and their relatives: personal experience of Alzheimer’s and 
of the provision of care’ (2003) Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 10(2) 187-197.  
37 D. Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (Vintage, 2005), at p 1-15.  
38 A. Asch, ‘Distracted by Disability’ (1998) 7 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 77.   
39 L.C. Vogel et al, ‘Long-term Outcomes and Life Satisfaction of Adults Who Had Pediatric Spinal 
Cord Injuries’ (1998) 79 Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 1496.  
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directive. It is difficult to know therefore, what degree of ‘anticipation’ or foresight is 
demanded by the statute, especially in the context of dementia.    
 
D. Lack of contemporaneous capacity assessment 
As Jonathan Herring and Jesse Wall observe, legal capacity ‘typically seeks to 
determine the minimum necessary for autonomy and treats the person as autonomous 
once they cross that threshold.’40 If an advance decision is to be autonomous, its 
author must therefore at the very least be demonstrated to have capacity.  
 
Under section 2(1) MCA, 'a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the 
material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter 
because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.' 
Section 3(1) further explains that: 'for the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to 
make a decision for himself if he is unable- 
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
(b) to retain that information,  
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision, or  
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or 
any other means).'  
An essential part of the capacity assessment is therefore determining that the person 
understands (and can retain and use) the information relevant to the decision. 
According to the Code of Practice, the relevant information for making a decision 
includes: the nature of the decision, the reason why the decision is needed, and 
the likely effects of deciding one way or another, or making no decision at all.41 The 
test for capacity therefore mirrors the minimalist conception of autonomy articulated 
above. 
 
The MCA rightly limits the creation of directives to people with capacity, over 18,42 
and the accompanying Code of Practice goes further: “it is important to be able to 
establish that the person making the advance decision.... had the capacity to make that 
decision when they made it”.43 Yet despite Willmott’s contention that “it is axiomatic 
that only a competent individual should be able to complete an advance directive,”44 
nothing is required by way of a contemporaneous assessment of capacity or 
documentation to this effect.  
 
 
40 J. Herring and J. Wall, ‘Autonomy, capacity and vulnerable adults: filling the gaps in the Mental 
Capacity Act’(2015) Legal Studies 35(4), 698–719, 702. 
41 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (London: TSO, 
2007), 4.16 
42 MCA, s24.  
43 Supra n41, s9.8. 
44 L. Willmott, ‘Advance Directives and the promotion of autonomy: A comparative Australian 
statutory analysis’(2010) 17 JLM 556, 566.  
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As with the rest of the MCA,45 a presumption exists in favour of finding capacity 
“unless they are aware of reasonable grounds to doubt the person had the capacity to 
make the advance decision at the time they made it”.46 Despite Munby J’s dicta in HE 
v A Hospital Trust that doubts should always be resolved in favour of the person 
having capacity however,47 concerns have resulted in invalidating directives.  
In A Local Authority v E,48 an advance directive was deemed invalid notwithstanding 
that it complied with the relevant formalities, appeared to be clearly applicable, and E 
had been advised both by her Independent Mental Health Advocate and solicitor that 
she had capacity to write it. E was a 32 year-old woman with severe anorexia nervosa, 
who had written a directive to the effect that if she was close to death, she did not 
want tube feeding or life support. The words of Peter Jackson J are telling:  
“Against such an alerting background, a full, reasoned and contemporaneous 
assessment evidencing mental capacity to make such a momentous decision 
would in my view be necessary. No such assessment occurred in E's case and I 
think it at best doubtful that a thorough investigation at the time would have 
reached the conclusion that she had capacity.”49  
 
In the absence of a well-documented contemporaneous capacity assessment therefore, 
it is difficult to feel confident that the decision being made is at least minimally 
autonomous and carries the resulting moral authority.   
 
E. Conclusion 
Given the difficulties in applying these provisions in the context of dementia, the 
immunity from liability for doctors who fail to uphold directives clearly provides 
considerable discretion for doctors not to comply with directives in circumstances 
when they are not satisfied that it is valid or applicable. This flexibility is essential. As 
Jonathan Herring argues, to deny someone beneficial treatment on the basis of a non-
autonomous refusal can infringe their rights, and “have serious consequences for their 
long term welfare and ability to exercise their autonomy in other occasions”. 50 This is 
especially so where the treatment in question is life-sustaining. It is imperative 
therefore that doctors have a mechanism by which they can choose not to follow a 
decision if they deem it to be non-autonomous or non-applicable to a given scenario. 
Rather than removing some of the doctor’s discretion under s26 to override directives 
therefore, the focus should be instead on tightening the conditions surrounding the 
creation of directives so that clinicians feel more comfortable upholding them, and 
have more information available to them to allow them to make informed 
determinations over their validity and applicability. A framework must be created to 
 
45 MCA, s1.  
46 Supra n41, s9.8.  
47 [2003] EWHC 1017, 415.  
48 [2012] EWCOP 1639.  
49 ibid, [65].  
50 J Herring, ‘Peter Skegg and the Question No-One Asks: Why Presume Capacity?’ in M Henaghan 
and J Wall (eds), Law, Ethics, and Medicine: Essays in Honour of Peter Skegg (Thomson Reuters 
2016).  
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give doctors clearer guidance on the information available to the person when they 
were drafting the directive, and when the advance directive was intended to apply, if 
they are to feel confident that they are following the clear and unequivocal wishes of 
the patient. 
 
Even if efforts can be made to enhance the specificity of directives, there remains the 
problem of where the values and priorities that underpinned a directive have changed. 
While this is a problem inherent to making decisions in advance, steps can be taken to 
help clinicians identify those situations where this has occurred, thus providing them 
the necessary information to bring substance to the provisions in section 25 MCA.   
 
IV HOW CAN THE LAW BETTER SAFEGUARD AUTONOMY IN 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES? 
 
Under the current legal regime, while the person making an advance directive must be 
competent,51 and the decision reached be valid and ‘applicable’ to the situation at 
hand,52 there are no safeguards in the Act designed to ensure that the person is in fact 
competent, informed, or free from undue influence when drafting the advance 
directive. In light of the difficulties in ensuring the autonomy of anticipatory decisions, 
this section will suggest amendments to the legal framework of advance directives, to 
provide greater safeguards aimed at ensuring that decisions are, when drafted, 
sufficiently autonomous.  
 
The proposed changes will require doctors to play a central role in the drafting of 
directives, ensuring both that the person is competent and informed, and that the 
directive is drafted with sufficient specificity and clarity that it is easy to interpret and 
implement by the later doctor. In fact, evidence suggests that the lack of physician 
involvement could be affecting the implementation of directives. Although his 
research focused on the Netherlands, Vezzoni found doctors to have a low opinion of 
the effectiveness of advance directives, often choosing not to follow them where they 
conflicted with their medical judgment.53 The lack of compliance among doctors was 
attributed to their belief that the lack of physician involvement rendered them “of low 
medical quality”,54 a view supported by the findings of Schiff et al who raised similar 
concerns that “so few geriatricians had been involved in the construction of living 
wills”.55 More involvement by healthcare professionals in the drafting of directives 
might therefore make doctors feel more comfortable in upholding them.  
 
 
51 MCA, s24(1).  
52 MCA, s25(1). 
53 C Vezzoni, The Legal Status and Social Practice of Treatment Directives in the Netherlands 
(Groningen: RUG, 2005), cited in E Marike et al, ‘Advance Directives in Dementia: issues of validity 
and effectiveness.’ (2010) InternationalPsychogeriatrics 22:2, 201-208. 
54 ibid, 205.  
55 R. Schiff et al,  ‘Living wills and the Mental Capacity Act: A postal questionnaire survey of UK 
geriatricians’ (2006) Age and Ageing 35:116-121, 119.  
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A. Greater Involvement of the Medical Profession 
Given the problems identified above concerning the lack of contemporaneous 
capacity assessment, it seems a well-documented contemporaneous capacity 
assessment is required if the directive is to be upheld, and though it need not be by a 
doctor, a medical opinion will indubitably carry greater ‘clout’ in both hospital and 
courtroom. In the absence of this assessment, it is difficult to have confidence that the 
decision was truly autonomous.  
 
The effect of this would be to reverse the presumption of capacity that exists 
elsewhere in the MCA, at least in evidential terms. The desirability of a presumption 
of capacity outside of the context of advance directives has been questioned 
elsewhere,56 and it is not the intention of this paper to engage in that debate. In his 
seminal paper on the issue however, Peter Skegg quoted from Lord Donaldson in Re 
T, where he suggested that “doctors faced with a refusal of consent have to give very 
careful and detailed consideration to the patient’s capacity to decide at the time when 
the decision was made”.57 In a similar vein, the MCA Code of Practice is clear about 
the importance in carrying out an assessment of capacity wherever capacity is in 
doubt.58 While the comprehensiveness of this assessment may differ depending on the 
patient and circumstances, it certainly seems unlikely (and perhaps even negligent), 
notwithstanding the presumption of capacity, that a doctor would permit someone to 
make a contemporaneous refusal of life-sustaining treatment without clear evidence 
that the person understands the nature and consequences of the decision. As a doctor 
later called upon to implement a directive has no opportunity to assess whether the 
person would have had capacity, it would not therefore seem such a significant step to 
require clear evidence of a contemporaneous capacity assessment at the time of 
drafting the decision.  Of course this would play more than just an evidential role – 
reversing the presumption would also mean that if there were cases in which the 
person had an assessment but their capacity remained uncertain, the presumption 
would not operate to later render the decision enforceable. Given the clear harm of 
tying someone with dementia to a decision that is no longer deemed in their best 
interests however, it is difficult to justify upholding an advance directive where their 
capacity at the time of drafting was doubtful.   
 
In order for an advance directive to be binding therefore, the person should have to be 
assessed to see if they meet the test for capacity under the MCA. Given the 
requirements of the test for capacity, a person making a decision would need to know 
their prognosis, understand the associated symptoms, and comprehend the 
consequences both of their illness, and of any treatment decision they make in relation 
to it. As discussed above, this presents two difficulties in respect of advance 
 
56 Supra n49; PDG Skegg “Presuming Competence to Consent: Could Anything be Sillier?” (2011) 30 
UQLJ 165. 
 57 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 113A.   
 58 Supra n41, 4.34.  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directives: firstly, how can it be ensured that a person fully understands the nature of 
the conditions (and treatments) included within their directive, particularly where 
their decision might relate to a range of conditions which they have not been 
diagnosed with and therefore have not had cause to fully consider? Secondly, there 
will undoubtedly be occasions where, owing to some medical advance, the prognosis 
of a condition has altered significantly since the directive was made. Does this render 
the original decision invalid? Both of these go to the question of whether the advance 
directive was sufficiently autonomous.   
 
In the latter case, we clearly cannot be justified in upholding the directive, given that 
it was made with no real understanding of the nature and consequences of the 
decision. This situation would be captured in the provision in s25(4)(c) MCA 
discussed above, and so the doctor would not be liable for overriding it.  
 
More difficult is the first concern raised, that directives may be made without 
sufficient information or understanding of either the potential future condition, or the 
treatment options.  There is currently no legal requirement that any discussion with a 
healthcare professional need take place, notwithstanding that the Law Commission 
noted prior to the legislation, that a decision “made independently of any discussion 
with a healthcare professional might often be based on erroneous ideas and 
information”.59  
 
Perhaps as a result of the lack of legislation, various informal attempts have been 
made to ensure that individuals gain the requisite information. The Alzheimer’s 
Society in its Factsheet on Advance Decisions recommends a discussion with a GP, 
who can provide “information on how your illness is likely to affect you as it 
progresses”, and help you “understand the advantages and disadvantages of choosing 
or refusing medical procedures in advance.”60 The Alzheimer’s Association too, in 
their End of Life Decisions Guide, has set out information about various treatment 
options which may become relevant in the later stages of Alzheimer’s, including 
respirators, feeding tubes, antibiotics and DNACPR orders, as well as palliative and 
hospice care.61 
 
While these measures are important, they do not obviate the need to consider a 
statutory requirement. Interestingly, many Canadian territories,62 and Australian 
states63 also do not make receipt of medical information a prerequisite for the validity 
 
59 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Law Com No 231 (HMSO, 1995), 5.30.  
60 Alzheimer’s Society, Factsheet 463LP, Advance Decisions and Advance Statement, November 2014, 
available at <http://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/download_info.php?fileID=2659>, 6. 
61 Alzheimer’s Association, ‘End of life decisions: Honoring the wishes of a person with Alzheimer's 
disease’ (2014), < https://www.alz.org/national/documents/brochure_endoflifedecisions.pdf>, 5.  
62 E.g. British Columbia (Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, RSBC 1996, c 
181), Saskatchewan (Health Care Directives and Substitute Health Care Decision Maker Act (Sask.) 
S.S. 1997, c. H-0.001, ss. 15-16), Alberta (Personal Directives Act, RSA 2000, c P-6) etc.  
63 E.g. South Australia (Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA)); Australian 
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of a directive, and in Western Australia, although advice is “encouraged”, it is not 
obligatory.64 In fact, imposing such a requirement is rare. In Victoria, for example, 
following concerns by Victoria’s Social Development Committee that advance 
directives “appear to involve an uninformed refusal of treatment in a wide range of 
unforeseeable circumstances”,65 a requirement was introduced that medical 
information must be provided before the directive can be witnessed, the witness 
attesting to the fact that the individual has received the information and understood 
it.66 In Austria meanwhile, medical (and legal) advice is mandatory, requiring doctors 
to inform patients about the nature and consequences of the directive, as well as any 
alternatives, and to certify that the patient has correctly understood the advice.67 
Similarly in Hungary, a directive must be accompanied by a written statement made 
by a board-certified psychiatrist indicating that the person made the decision in full 
awareness of its consequences.68 In the absence of such a discussion with a healthcare 
professional, it is difficult to be sure that the decision reached meets even the most 
basic requirements of an autonomous decision: that it is competent and informed, 
made in full contemplation and understanding of the nature and consequences of the 
decision. Doctors should play a vital role in the drafting of directives: testing the 
patient’s understanding of the information presented to them, correcting any 
misinformation, directing the person to how they might respond to different 
eventualities, and discussing why they have chosen as they have. These may all be 
ways of also arriving at decisions which will better reflect their essential values, thus 
promoting even a more demanding conception of autonomy. 
 
Caring for someone with dementia places a huge burden, both financial and emotional, 
on the person’s family.  Clinicians, when satisfying themselves that a person has 
given freely informed and capacitious consent to a directive, must also be confident 
that it is not the result of familial (or other) pressure. There is no straightforward way 
of assessing this, not least since directives are often intended by the author precisely 
to spare their loved ones the burden of care or making difficult decisions on their 
behalf. 69 Nonetheless, where a doctor has real concerns about this, he cannot attest to 
the patient having given a competent and informed refusal.  
 
 
Capital Territory (Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT)); the Northern Territory 
(Natural Death Act 1989 (NT)) and Queensland (Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld)).  
 64 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), ss 110Q(1)(b).  
65 Victoria Parliament Social Development Committee, Report Upon the Inquiry Into Options for 
Dying With Dignity: Second and Final Report (Melbourne: F. D. Atkinson, Government Printer, 1987), 
50.   
66 Note that advance directives can only be made for people with a particular condition in Victoria. The 
Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s5(1)(c) requires information to be given about the condition to the 
extent which is reasonably sufficient to enable the patient to make a decision about whether or not to 
refuse medical treatment.  
67 Patientenverfügungs-Gesetz (2006)- full text (translated) available at: 
<http://www.patientenanwalt.com/english-documents/legal-information.html>.  
68 Health Care Act of 1997 (Hungary), Art 22.3.  
69 Black et al. ‘Surrogate decision-makers’ understanding of dementia patients’ prior wishes for end-of-
life care’ (2009) Journal of Aging and Health 21:627-650. 
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B. Introducing formality requirements 
It has been argued above that a concern, both from an ethical perspective and in terms 
of applying the legal framework, is that directives are often drafted with insufficient 
detail to discern what the person’s decision was in relation to a given set of 
circumstances. Clearly upholding an advance decision cannot be respecting a person’s 
autonomy if the decision is applied in circumstances that were not anticipated or 
intended by the author to be captured. Mechanisms to enhance the focus and 
specificity of advance directives may therefore give more guidance to clinicians on 
the circumstances in which the directive was intended to apply, and what the author 
desired in response. They may also provide evidence by which to determine when 
there has been a radical change in the values and priorities of the author such that a 
directive, even when informed and autonomous at the time of drafting, may no longer 
represent their wishes.  
 
One way in which more focus might be achieved is through the introduction of 
formalities.  Currently, these are only required if the decision is to refuse life-
sustaining treatment,70 unlike many other jurisdictions (for example across all of 
Australia and Canada) where formalities attach to all directives. This was a very 
deliberate decision by the Law Commission: ‘[a]lthough we gave careful 
consideration to the introduction of statutory requirements prescribing the form and 
contents of any advance refusal, we conclude that these would benefit no-one.’71 
Given the potential this leaves for vague and ambiguous decisions, or throwaway 
comments, to become binding on a person, strong justification must be proferred for 
this policy choice. Yet justification is severely lacking. As Maclean asserts, that the 
previous common law focused on the nature of the decision and not the way it had 
been recorded does not justify keeping the law that way.72 At the very least, directives 
should be written down, signed, and dated, a view supported by The Joint Committee 
on Human Rights who stated, “it is not clear to us why advance directives should not 
carry the additional safeguard that they should be required to be in writing.”73  
 
While the advance directives of most dementia patients currently concern life-
sustaining treatment74 (not exclusively: many relate to Electric Convulsive Therapy), 
formalities should nevertheless apply throughout. Written instructions tend to be more 
specific and give a clearer sense of the breadth of the decision, while the formality of 
writing often has a channeling affect, ensuring the person is aware that they are 
making a legally binding decision, and perhaps causing them to think harder about it 
as a result.  At the very least, a written directive provides evidence of its content 
beyond mere ‘hearsay’, thus potentially giving the healthcare professional “more 
 
70 MCA, s25(5).  
71 Supra n59, 5.29.  
72 A. Maclean, ‘Advance Directives and the rocky waters of anticipatory decision-making’ (2008) 16 
Med L Rev 1, 11.  
73 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Twenty Third Report of 2003–04, para 2.46. 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtrights/ 210/21004.html>. 
74 Supra n2.  
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confidence in the authenticity and currency” of the directive.75 It is noticeable that 
Lasting Powers of Attorney must follow a prescribed form, including being signed, 
witnessed and dated, notwithstanding the fact that an LPA must always act in the best 
interests of the incapacitated person. Given a directive may be contrary to the 
person’s best interests therefore, at least the same degree of formality might be 
expected.  
 
One of the Government’s fears was that requiring formalities to create directives 
would necessitate formalities for their revocation, making it excessively onerous for 
people to change their mind.76  Certainly there is a risk that formalities could serve to 
frustrate the autonomy of those who reassess, tying them to an out-dated decision. 
While an informal revocation process could (and indeed does in the context of life-
sustaining advance directives) exist alongside a formal process of creation, concerns 
may be raised over whether ‘hearsay’ evidence that they reneged will outweigh a 
clear written expression of their will. Of course it remains at the doctor’s discretion to 
decide whether such actions constitute behaviour ‘inconsistent with the decision’,77 
and it seems likely that where there is clear evidence of a change of heart, this will be 
taken seriously. Where there is ambiguity, it is better that the previously-binding 
advance decision is given some weight by becoming part of the evidence adduced in 
the ‘best interests assessment’, than risk undermining their autonomy altogether by 
tying them to an outdated decision that no longer reflects their values and priorities.  
 
Dating clearly evidences how recently those views have been expressed and thus how 
likely they are to still remain current. This does not mean that a directive written a 
long time ago should not be considered binding, but merely that given the risks 
associated with the person’s values and priorities changing, an up-to-date document is 
more likely to be an accurate reflection of the person’s intention, and therefore the 
clinician can feel more confident in upholding it. Certainly the case law suggests as 
much: in X Primary Care Trust v XB,78 much emphasis was placed on the fact that the 
doctor regularly reviewed the directive to check whether it still reflected his wishes, 
while in Re AK, the recentness of the decision was paramount.79 Although there is 
currently no review requirement on the face of the Act, the Code of Practice is clear 
that they should be reviewed regularly, and that “[d]ecisions made a long time ago are 
not automatically invalid or inapplicable, but they may raise doubts”.80  
 
 
75 Supra n44 568.  
76 The Government's Response to the Scrutiny Committee's Report on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill 
(2004) <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/pubs/reports/mental-
incapacity.htm>. 
77 MCA, s25(2).  
78 [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam). 
79 [2001] 1 FLR 129, [unknown].  
80 Supra n41 9.29.  
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Of course formalities inevitably erode some of the flexibility involved in creating 
advance directives. Yet as W Healthcare Trust v H illustrates,81 oral advance 
directives are often not sufficiently detailed to be applicable anyway, with doctors 
understandably reluctant to be bound by what may seem a throwaway comment made 
many years previously. Far from being an obstacle, the validation conferred by 
formalities could actually help clinicians in implementing directives.  
 
C. Introducing a proforma 
Even written directives can be unhelpfully vague however, with few people going 
beyond rejecting ‘life-sustaining treatment’ to consider specific treatments they might 
accept in the vicinity of death. This makes it difficult to know whether the 
circumstances in question had been contemplated by the person at the time of drafting, 
and therefore whether the decision has been made with full understanding of the 
nature and consequences of the specific choice they are now facing. One means of 
overcoming this would be to introduce a proforma, in which directives might record 
precise instructions in a range of likely scenarios. Certainly all jurisdictions in 
Australia except Queensland require that the directive, if made in writing, adheres to a 
prescribed form,82 and Willmott is positive about its impact on “encourag[ing] 
individuals to think carefully about their wishes regarding treatment, and to translate 
those wishes into specific instructions.”83 Schiff et al also found that two-thirds of the 
geriatricians interviewed felt that a proforma specifically designed for the elderly 
would be useful.84  
The difficulty lies in designing a form sufficiently detailed to offer real assistance to 
the clinician, yet general enough to be capable of covering a range of conditions. In 
fact, Australia’s statutory proformas, arguably fail to achieve this. In Western 
Australia for example, the form merely states that,  
In the following circumstances:  
I consent/refuse consent (cross out and initial one of these) to the following 
treatment:85   
This is similar to the proforma found in Southern Australia.86 In both, it falls to the 
patient to supply both the triggering events, and a list of treatments they will refuse, 
 
81 Supra n34.  
82 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s7(2); Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 (WA), s110Q(1)(a); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s5(2); Medical 
Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT), ss8 and 21, Approved Form 2007 No 55; Natural 
Death Act 1989 (NT), s4(1).   
83 Supra n44, 568.  
84 Supra n55, 117.  
85 Accessible at < 
http://www.health.wa.gov.au/docreg/education/population/HP11536_advance_health_directive_for
m.pdf>  
86 Accessible at 
<http://www.advancecaredirectives.sa.gov.au/upload/home/ACDFormSAMPLEsecure.pdf>.  
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retaining a considerable degree of ambiguity. Even that designed by the Alzheimer’s 
Society with dementia specifically in mind, leaves it to the individual to specify what 
types of ‘life-sustaining’ medical interventions they would find unacceptable,87 and 
though that of Compassion in Dying offers significantly more detail regarding 
triggering circumstances, it again does not list specific life-sustaining treatments.88 As 
people will not necessarily anticipate all the different treatments that might fall within 
the broad term ‘life-sustaining’, it is helpful if the proforma can give some direction 
as to the sorts of treatments that can arise, including ventilation, defibrillation, 
artificial nutrition or hydration, or in some circumstances, something as minor as 
antibiotics. This will help to ensure that the person gives proper consideration to what 
they would want in a range of likely scenarios.   
Certainly proformas have the potential to be useful. The directive provided by 
Compassion in Dying, like that in Southern Australia, allows the individual to also 
state more generally their wishes, feelings and values, which both aids in interpreting 
the directive (and determining whether the original decision was autonomous in a 
more demanding sense), and may also help to determine what is in their best interests 
in circumstances which fall outside of it. Alzheimer Europe, in their Position Report, 
encourage people to write “statements of value” precisely because of “difficulties in 
obtaining an appropriate level of precision (which is neither too vague nor too specific 
to be of practical use)”.89 Providing the doctor with information as to the values 
underpinning the decision may also help them to identify those situations where the 
values are no longer relevant to the person, thus raising questions over whether the 
directive ought to still be upheld.  
Proformas relating to specific conditions may also be of particular utility to a clinician. 
Where the disease is degenerative like dementia, given the range of problems that 
may emerge at different stages, it may be useful to have a proforma which directs the 
patient to the sorts of decisions and treatments they might encounter during the 
development of the illness, as the Alzheimer’s Association endeavours to do in their 
End of Life Decisions Guide.90 This could help to overcome some of the epistemic 
problems identified earlier, that people face an informational gap when making 
decisions in advance which can undermine the extent to which they may be 
considered autonomous. In fact, one problem with adopting a general statutory 
proforma is precisely that the condition-specific ones, which have the most potential 
to assist clinicians, would become obsolete. Thus rather than enhancing the 
information available to clinicians, they could serve to reduce it. While you could 
build in ‘plug-ins’ requiring you to complete a condition-specific proforma in some 
 
87 Accessible at < http://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/download_info.php?fileID=2659>. 
accessed 4th July. 
88 Compassion in Dying, Advance Decision Pack, accessible at 
<http://compassionindying.org.uk/library/advance-decision-pack/> accessed 16th July. 
89 Alzheimer Europe, ‘Position Paper on the Use of Advance Directives’ (2009) 
<http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Policy-in-Practice2/Our-opinion-on/Advance-directives> 
Executive Summary, point (d).   
90 Supra n61.  
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cases, as it is unlikely that a person would complete such a proforma without having 
first been diagnosed with that condition, this may be tantamount in practice to 
introducing a ‘current condition requirement’, which would be problematic in the 
context of dementia, where many people have already lost legal capacity by the time 
they are diagnosed.91  
D. A non-statutory proforma  
Even if it may be overly restrictive to statutorily require proformas, it is clear that 
they could serve a useful function if carefully drafted. Perhaps therefore the solution 
is somewhere between legislation and policy. A directive should (in order to be 
legally binding), be in written form, dated, and signed by both the individual and the 
doctor (attesting to the fact that the person is competent, informed, and free from 
undue influence). Though it should not be mandatory, it should also be encouraged 
that the directive includes certain information designed to help the implementing 
physician to interpret the directive. This information may include the following:  
1. Details of when the advance directive should be triggered; 
2. Details of the treatments that the advance directive is intended to apply to;  
3. Details of any treatments which the advance directive is explicitly not 
intended to apply to;  
4. A statement of values, detailing the wishes or priorities underpinning the 
decision;  
5. Details of any future events which might affect the applicability of the 
advance directive, for example pregnancy, children, marriage, or other value 
changes.  
A proforma should be designed that meets these standards, and should be easily 
accessible both online (for example on the NHS and Gov.uk websites), and in GP 
surgeries. Once completed, the doctor may then assess the person’s understanding of 
the things included within the directive and their capacity, and, based on a discussion 
with them about the reasoning behind the directive, suggest changes or other things to 
include or exclude from its remit. The doctor may also make suggestions on measures 
to improve the specificity and interpretation of it, if deemed necessary. This ‘standard’ 
proforma may also help by acting as a springboard to discussions between doctor and 
patient, and direct the patient’s mind to certain issues which will enable them to 
formulate a directive that best reflects their values and priorities.  
Where a person writes a directive which does not use the standard form, the doctor, 
when attesting to their capacity, will have the opportunity to read and discuss the 
directive with the person, and suggest ways in which it might be may be better drafted. 
A person should not have to follow the suggestions given by the doctor, but if they 
fail to do so, they should be made aware that there is an increased risk that the 
directive will either fail to be implemented by doctors (if it is too vague or 
ambiguous), or will tie them to decisions that they hadn’t intended it to apply to. In 
 
91 S. Fazel et al, ‘Assessment of competence to complete ADs: validation of a patient-centred approach’ 
(1999) BMJ, 318, 493–497.  
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this sense, the role of the doctor is similar to that of a solicitor in the drafting of a will, 
guiding and questioning the person to ensure that the document produced reflects 
what it is that they want to achieve. Like drafting a will, a person can, if they prefer, 
choose to do it themselves, without either legal advice or a proforma, and this may be 
effective. However if the person wants to ensure there are no complications in the 
implementation of it, they are advised to follow legal advice. Adopting this method 
would help to ensure that the advance directive was competent and informed, as well 
as enhancing the specificity and applicability of the directive.  
 
E. Ensuring Advance Directives are Known to Clinicians   
 
The safeguards above will help improve the robustness of advance directives, and 
ensure that we can be more confident in the authenticity and relevancy of the decision. 
However there remains however a further problem – to ensure that the autonomous 
wishes of an individual are not frustrated, the directive must come to the attention of 
the treating clinician at the relevant time. This is especially problematic given the lack 
of formalities that currently pertain to making a binding directive: an oral declaration 
to a friend or an instruction scribbled on a piece of paper and placed in a drawer for 
many years can be sufficient to constitute a directive - it is likely that many directives 
therefore never come to the attention of the physician at all. For those with dementia 
that is sufficiently advanced to render them incapacitated, it is further doubtful that 
we can always rely on them to bring to the doctor’s attention its existence, content, or 
location.  
 
Many jurisdictions have adopted a national registry for advance directives. Spanish 
law for example, provides for the creation of a National Registry for directives, with 
each Autonomous Region having an official registry where citizens can register their 
directives,92 while many US States have enacted statutes that establish such a 
registry.93 In addition to the statutory registries, seven private national registries also 
exist, such as the “U.S. Living Will Registry” and “DocuBank”, which store advance 
directives in an online database accessible by all healthcare providers.94 In the UK, 
the Organ Donor Register provides a useful model, while the establishment of 
national registers of directives across Europe has been urged by the Alzheimer’s 
Europe in their ‘Guiding Principles’.95 
 
Given the problems in accessing directives, “having a secure repository where 
advance directives can quickly and easy be retrieved by healthcare providers or 
 
92 Law no. 41/2002 on Patient’s Autonomy and on the Rights and Obligations Concerning Health 
Information (Spain), Article11.  
93 eg Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §36-3291; Idaho Code Ann. §39-4515; also see n159 and n160.  
94 Accessible at <https://www.uslivingwillregistry.com>. 
95 Supra n74, 16(d).  
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named proxies” seems, as Allison Hughes observes, “like an obvious solution.”96  
(With the caveat that there is as yet insufficient evidence to establish how effectively 
the US system is working.97) It may also exercise a cautionary function: knowing it 
will be a matter of public record, and less easy to amend than a piece of paper in a 
desk drawer, might make the writer think more carefully before registering an 
advance directive.  
 
Even the simplest idea is not without its complexities. In the US for example, the 
registries vary hugely over whether they are computerised, how they are funded, 
whether the directives are vetted for legal efficiency and who can access the record.  
While it may seem axiomatic that the registries should be maintained online (as in all 
US States except California and Louisiana98), and that directives should be vetted for 
their compliance with legal stipulations at registration, this inevitably comes at a price 
(in fact only Maryland and Montana are required by law to review advance 
directives99). While it is important not to create barriers by setting high fees for 
registering directives (LPAs in England provide a cautionary tale in this regard), with 
the public purse as stretched as it currently is in the UK, such a scheme may require 
some form of private funding.   
 
A cheaper alternative might be to register all directives in people’s medical records, 
as in Finland.100 If the recommendations above for making discussions with a medical 
professionals mandatory are accepted, it would not be a significant step for the 
directive to be added to the person’s health records at the time of consultation. Indeed 
Hughes favours medical records over a registry precisely because of the focal role it 
gives to doctors.101 To be effective however, it would require the completion of 
integrated electronic health records, itself both timely and costly. Without this it is 
doubtful they could be sufficiently promptly accessible, especially given current 
problems with transferring GPs’ notes. A national registry may therefore be advisable.  
 
It would of course make revocation more difficult, but it is not clear that the barrier 
involved in going online to alter one’s preferences is sufficiently grave to override the 
clear advantages of the system.  Rather, it provides an easy means of ensuring that the 
advance directive always reflects the current wishes of the individual: with the US 
Living Will Register for example, participants are contacted annually to confirm that 
their wishes have not changed, and can log in at any time to amend or revoke a 
directive. Of course this comes with the risk that the person may revoke it at a time 
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they lack capacity. If however a person feels sufficiently strongly that they do not 
want the directive to be determinative of their treatment, again it would surely be 
better to permit them to revoke it.  
 
Perhaps more complicated is the issue of alterations. Clearly it would be at odds with 
the above discussion if a person could go online and amend their directive to refuse 
treatments in a wider range of circumstances (or to refuse a wider range of treatments) 
without any assessment of capacity or understanding. It could be built into the registry 
that you may amend the directive online to cover fewer treatments, but would require 
a further consultation if you wish to cover more treatments. If the person decides to 
proceed in making changes without this, this could be kept on record (similar to a 
codicil in a will) to be used as evidence in a best interests assessment, even if not 
legally binding.  
 
In fact, the relatively few empirical studies in this area indicate that treatment 
preferences among those who have signed advance directives remain relatively stable. 
Danis et al, when examining patients' choices for life-sustaining treatment, found 
those with living wills had very stable preferences (86%),102 and while Ditto et al 
ultimately found a lack of preference stability, participants with directives did show 
far greater stability than those without.103 Though these findings should be treated 
with csome caution (the time frames were markedly shorter than the lifespan of most 
directives), this nonetheless indicates that those who have completed advance 
directives are likely to have put a high degree of thought into them, and it should not 
be assumed that time will necessarily affect their preferences. Revocation and 
alteration may not therefore be a problem that afflicts many advance directive users.  
 
 V EVALUATING THE FRAMEWORK 
Under the changes proposed, the role of the doctor would thus become paramount: 
they would be expected to discuss with the patient their precise intentions in relation 
to a range of scenarios, as well as the kinds of things that might affect that decision in 
the future. Of course enhancing the autonomy of the advance directive would not 
alleviate the second ethical problem identified above, of the person’s values changing 
in the future. However it may help the doctor implementing the advance directive to 
know whether this has occurred, and therefore when the decision may no longer 
represent their values and priorities. Where the person explicitly states that they do 
not intend the directive to be binding in certain circumstances, on certain decisions, or 
following certain events or lifestyle changes, this clearly helps the clinician assess the 
scope and applicability of the directive. Even where the relevant situation does not 
fall within one of these situations however, the use of a statement of values might 
 
102 M Danis et al, ‘Stability of choices about life-sustaining treatments’ (1994) Ann Intern Med 120: 
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103 PH Ditto et al, ‘Stability of older adults’ preferences for life-sustaining medical treatment’ (2003) 
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help the clinician to discern whether the current circumstances are the sort anticipated 
and planned for by the person, and provide them with some evidence to determine 
whether these values have changed significantly since signing the directive. This will 
give substance to the provisions in s25 MCA that the directive is inapplicable where 
there are circumstances that the person did not anticipate which would have affected 
his decision.104 
This suggestion would necessitate a radical shift in the law’s treatment of advance 
directives, placing much greater demands on both the person wishing to create an 
advance directive, and the GP involved in its drafting. While such requirements are 
perfectly plausible, they would of course limit the circumstances in which directives 
can be created. Where previously they could be created informally at any time, this 
requires at the very least a visit to the doctor. Although concerns exist that this might 
privilege the wealthy and educated, who are more likely to be aware of, and know 
how to meet, the strict requirements laid out in this paper, it is not clear that directives 
create any greater problem in this regard than the drafting of wills, or even contracts. 
Those who place significant value on their prospective autonomy will take the 
necessary steps to ensure their directive is binding, including a discussion with a 
healthcare professional if necessary.  
 
It is also important to note that rendering an advance directive invalid does not render 
it useless. In the absence of a binding directive (or LPA), decisions must be made in a 
patient’s ‘best interests’,105 which requires the decision-maker to consider inter alia, 
‘the person's past and present wishes and feelings’.106 Therefore a directive, even if 
not binding, should provide an important means of determining such wishes. 
Increasingly this provision appears to be gaining weight in the best interests 
calculus107 - even should the balance be tipped in favour of greater formality and 
procedural hurdles therefore, s4(6) MCA continues to provide a means of protecting 
people’s prospective autonomy, and ensuring that their values and priorities underpin 
the decisions made for and about them.  
 
Given this, it may be questioned whether we need to draw such a stark distinction 
between legally-binding directives, and the non-binding evidence of a person’s past 
wishes that forms part of their best interests assessment. One might instead suggest 
that we look at all the evidence we have of a person’s past views in the round (be that 
in written form or otherwise, informed or impromptu), to get a sense of what the 
person previously wanted, and feed this into our overall assessment of their best 
interests. This would permit a flexible approach to be maintained in difficult cases 
such as dementia, allowing evidence of their previous views to be balanced against 
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other factors and information, to reach the decision that is deemed best for the 
individual in the circumstances.   
 
While this might have the advantage of flexibility and sensitivity, it comes at great 
cost to the person’s autonomy. In a best interests assessment, the person’s wishes, 
even if a clear and thoughtful expression of their will, form just one part of the 
balance sheet. No one of the factors set out in section 4 is, on the face of the statute, to 
take priority in the best interests assessment, thus while the person’s past wishes may 
be an important part of the determination, they will ‘not necessarily be the deciding 
factor’. 108  A large degree of discretion is thus left to each decision-maker to decide 
on the weight to be accorded to them in the assessment, with the possibility that an 
individual’s previous expressions of will may frequently be outweighed by other 
factors. Certainly the House of Lords, in its post-legislative scrutiny of the MCA, was 
critical of the way that these provisions had been implemented in practice, observing 
‘the empowering ethos of the Act has not been widely implemented’.109 On the 
evidence reviewed, it found that the wishes, thoughts and feelings of the person 
lacking capacity were ‘not routinely prioritised’.110 Instead, ‘clinical judgments or 
resource-led decision-making predominate.’111  
 
An understandable reluctance among medical professionals to uphold the person’s 
previous wishes where they appear not to be in his or her best interests may therefore 
result in little value being accorded to the person’s autonomy and self-determination. 
Indeed the perceived importance of advance directives is precisely as a “means of 
preserving the autonomy of people with dementia and reflecting their human 
dignity”.112 Thompson et al, for example, found that in nine of 12 interviews 
conducted with healthcare professionals, and in all the focus groups, participants 
highlighted the importance of the directive in safeguarding autonomy when 
individuals can no longer communicate their wishes. One comment was particularly 
telling:  
“...it allows her to take responsibility for her own values...and for some people 
death isn’t the worst thing so it allows her to say that `this is my value 
judgement’, albeit at one point in time but `these things for me are worse than 
dying’ and that’s on record.” 113   
 
It is a truism that people often value things above life itself - relationships, dignity, 
religious values, or simply being free from pain. We have little difficulty accepting 
this in people who have capacity: their right to refuse treatment, even if it ends in 
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death, is enshrined both in our domestic114 and European law.115 But for a person to 
lose capacity does not mean that they are suddenly stripped of the essential values and 
preferences according to which they ordered their whole life, whether these be 
personal dignity, avoidance of pain, protection of loved ones, or religious obedience. 
When the contemporaneous exercise of autonomy is given such weight in medical 
practice, we must, as a matter of consistency, also accord respect to a person’s 
prospective autonomy. As Lord Millett noted in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, the right 
to self-determination is just as important “where the patient's refusal to give his 
consent has been expressed at an earlier date, before he became unconscious or 
otherwise incapable of communicating it...”116 
 
While allowing a degree of flexibility for a doctor not to uphold those decisions he 
does not consider fully autonomous or applicable is important, to deny anyone the 
chance of making a legally-binding decision about how they wish the final days of 
their life to play out would be to encroach too far into the realm of individual choice. 
As Ronald Dworkin writes, ‘making someone die in a way that others approve, but he 
believes a horrifying contradiction to his life, is a devastating, odious form of 
tyranny.’117 Advance directives, when appropriately drafted, empower people to avoid 
this tyranny.   
 
The effect of the proposed changes would be to mandate a much greater role for 
doctors, requiring them to act as ‘gatekeepers’ for the validity of advance directives. 
This will involve a reconceptualisation of the role of the doctor in end-of-life 
decisions, one which though desirable, and certainly timely, may nonetheless be 
uncomfortable for many healthcare professionals, especially given the time pressures 
already afflicting GPs. This involvement is however essential. Of course the move 
would have financial implications. While this is unavoidable, two observations should 
be borne in mind. Firstly, drafting directives is in fact relatively rare in the UK. A 
YouGov poll for Compassion in Dying in 2013 for example, indicated that only 4% of 
people in the UK had directives.118 It may not therefore be a severe financial burden. 
Secondly, given the extensive costs of many forms of life-sustaining treatment, the 
significant savings that would follow from rejecting them would go some way 
towards offsetting the increased costs associated with the drafting of these refusals.  
 
VI CONCLUSION 
Currently advance directives are not subject to any form of scrutiny, and may be 
drawn up without any reference to the healthcare profession. Given that the moral 
authority of directives rests on them being an autonomous decision by the person, it is 
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difficult to justify upholding them in the absence of measures to ensure that they are 
autonomous at the time of drafting, and applicable in the event of implementation. 
Through capacity assessments and consultations, both clinicians and the courts will be 
given the reassurance they need to feel more comfortable about upholding such 
decisions. The involvement of the clinician in drafting the directive can help to ensure 
both that the person understands the nature and consequences of the decision that they 
are making, and that the directive is sufficiently specific to be capable of 
implementation. The greater level of detail that is likely to come out of these 
discussions, and the use of a proforma, will also provide doctors with the evidence 
needed to make an assessment about its applicability. While this may require 
significant changes to the legal framework surrounding advance directives, changes 
which will undoubtedly be timely and costly for both patient and doctor, it is difficult 
to justify upholding directives in the absence of this. 
 
 
 
 
